Forecasted economic change and the self-fulfilling prophecy in economic decision-making by Petropoulos Petalas, D. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/169127
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-07 and may be subject to
change.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Forecasted economic change and the self-
fulfilling prophecy in economic decision-
making
Diamantis Petropoulos Petalas*☯, Hein van Schie☯, Paul Hendriks Vettehen☯
Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* d.petropoulos@bsi.ru.nl
Abstract
This study addresses the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, in the domain of economic decision-
making. We present experimental data in support of the hypothesis that speculative fore-
casts of economic change can impact individuals’ economic decision behavior, prior to any
realized changes. In a within-subjects experiment, participants (N = 40) played 180 trials in
a Balloon Analogue Risk Talk (BART) in which they could make actual profit. Simple mes-
sages about possible (positive and negative) changes in outcome probabilities of future tri-
als had significant effects on measures of risk taking (number of inflations) and actual profits
in the game. These effects were enduring, even though no systematic changes in actual out-
come probabilities took place following any of the messages. Risk taking also found to be
reflected in reaction times revealing increasing reaction times with riskier decisions. Positive
and negative economic forecasts affected reaction times slopes differently, with negative
forecasts resulting in increased reaction time slopes as a function of risk. These findings
suggest that forecasted positive or negative economic change can bias people’s mental
model of the economy and reduce or stimulate risk taking. Possible implications for media-
fulfilling prophecies in the domain of the economy are considered.
Introduction
Greece, June 2015: The country’s economic situation forced capital controls prompting a
three-week shut down of the banks. During this period, the majority of national and interna-
tional news organizations issued speculative news about a possible withdrawal of Greece from
the Eurozone (Grexit) and about the economic consequences of imminent capital control
measures. The national news media further speculated on prospect blockages in people’s sav-
ings accounts and safe deposit boxes (see [1] as an example). Also during this period, individu-
als flocked daily in front of ATMs to withdraw the maximally allowed amount of cash from
savings accounts. On July 20 when the banks opened again, customers thronged to access
deposit boxes. The example may be explained by a self-fulfilling prophecy effect: a change in
people’s mindset about future economic prospects affected their economic decisions in ways
that potentially could contribute to making the economic prospects come true.
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353 March 23, 2017 1 / 18
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Petropoulos Petalas D, van Schie H,
Hendriks Vettehen P (2017) Forecasted economic
change and the self-fulfilling prophecy in economic
decision-making. PLoS ONE 12(3): e0174353.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353
Editor: Hengyi Rao, University of Pennsylvania,
UNITED STATES
Received: August 5, 2016
Accepted: March 7, 2017
Published: March 23, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 Petropoulos Petalas et al. This
is an open access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: The study’s
accompanying data and full information files are
available in OSF (DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/T2BGJ |
ARK c7605/osf.io/t2bgj).
Funding: This research is sponsored by Radboud
University, and the Behavioural Science Institute,
http://www.ru.nl/bsi/, http://www.ru.nl/bsi/
research/research-programmes/communication-
media/. The funders had no role in study design,
data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
A self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when the adoption of a belief affects behavior in such a way,
that this belief becomes a reality. Self-fulfilling prophecy effects have been a topic of investiga-
tion in psychological research already from the 1960s, focusing mostly at the interpersonal
level [2–4]. However, already in the 1940s, sociologist Robert Merton discussed implications
of the self-fulfilling prophecy effect for the domain of the economy, in fact using a very similar
example as in the opening paragraph [5]. Recently, studies in finance and communication
research have presented empirical findings in line with the idea that media economic news are
responsible for stimulating or attenuating effects in the larger economy [6–35]. For instance,
studies using content analyses have identified different frames used in reporting of economic
news in the media [20–23], and studies using sentiment analyses have found correlations
between tone and/or sentiment of media economic news or macro-economic announcements
and changes in leading economic indicators [6,16,24–31]. By and large, these findings suggest
that self-fulfilling prophecies may very well apply in the domain of economic decision-making:
News provides people with a general belief on the direction of the economy, which in turn
influences economic choice.
Remarkably however, the idea that economic forecasts may influence people’s economic
decisions has not been investigated at the level of individual decision-making, as most studies in
finance and communication science have either focused on market level responses to economic
news or have measured individual responses to economic news at the level of attitudes and not
actual economic behavior of individuals [8,14,32]. Note furthermore that studies in psychology
do typically measure individual economic decision-making. However, these studies have mostly
focused on the affective influences and emotional processes contributing to individual eco-
nomic decision-making (reviews in [36,37]), for instance by manipulating framing [38], prim-
ing of emotions associated with market booms or burst [39], and emotional affect associated
with winning and losing [40]. Instead, the current study is directed at understanding to what
extent a cognitive belief or prediction about the future of the economy per se may impact eco-
nomic decision-making and cause a self-fulfilling prophecy effect in one’s economic situation.
The present study
Our study investigated the idea that simple messages forecasting changes in economic condi-
tions can impact behavioral decision-making, even before any change has manifested. Such an
effect would help to identify whether economic forecasts could affect an individual’s decision-
making exhibiting a self-fulfilling prophecy effect. To simulate a realistic decision-making situ-
ation that resembles real-world economic choice, we used the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART) [41]. The BART can be seen as a visual metaphor of a bubble economy at risk of a
burst, without knowing the exact point of burst.
In the original version of the BART, participants can acquire an increasing amount of
money by inflating a visual analogue of a balloon up to a point considered optimal. At every
successive inflation-step of the balloon, the accumulated value of the balloon increases, but so
does the probability for the balloon to burst. Therefore, each inflation step comes at the risk of
bursting the balloon and losing the value of the balloon accumulated up to that point. At any
moment, players can choose to withdraw and stop inflating the balloon as to save the acquired
amount to that point, and subsequently start inflating a new balloon.
Analogous to news forecasts that make predictions about the economy, we used simple pre-
dictive messages about the BART economy about a possible change in the size (smaller or
larger) at which balloons may burst. Importantly, although the points of balloon bursts varied
over trials in the game, the probabilities for balloon bursts associated with each inflation step
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
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were kept unchanged (and disclosed from participants) throughout the game. Crucially,
because of the inherent uncertainty in the probability of balloons’ points of bursts any predic-
tive message about the state of the BART economy would be very difficult to check for partici-
pants, analogous to news messages about the real economy.
The BART has been used previously to investigate framing effects [42–44] and effects of
emotion on risky choice [45–49]. To the best of our knowledge, there are no earlier investiga-
tions of the self-fulfilling prophecy effect using the BART.
Hypotheses and expectations. The core theoretical idea that is investigated in this study
is that forecasts about possible economic changes may influence people’s perception of risk
and consequently their economic decision-making, even before any actual change has become
apparent. This could provide a basis for a self-fulfilling prophecy effect in individual economic
decision-making. If this is true, we should be able to see direct effects of economic forecasts on
financial decision-making in the BART. Accordingly it was hypothesized that (H1) messages
about possible negative (positive) economic changes will result in reduced (increased) risk tak-
ing. At the operational level, we expected the effect of forecasted economic change to be visible
in the mean number of balloon inflations and consequentially the number of balloon bursts.
We also expected this effect on risk taking responses to be consistent across time, as economic
forecasts induce a change in perspective, and not a transient emotional response. Furthermore,
in line with the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, we anticipated economic messages to affect par-
ticipants’ actual earnings in the game.
Fundamental to changes in actual risk taking, we argue that economic forecasts may affect
perception of risk. In the BART, risk perception can be measured implicitly through reaction
times (RTs) [50–52]. The more risky a decision is, in terms of value at stake and probability of
losing, the longer it should take participants to make a choice. Accordingly, we hypothesized
that (H2) the increase in risk with each consecutive step in the BART will be accompanied by
an increase in RT. More importantly however, we reasoned that any change in perceived risk
following positive or negative messages about possible changes in future economic conditions
in the BART should also become evident in reaction times. More specifically we hypothesized
that (H3) the increased (decreased) perception of risk following negative (positive) forecasts
should accompanied by a steeper (more flattened) increase in RTs over inflations. At the oper-
ational level we thus predicted that successively riskier choices (inflation steps) in the BART
would result in increased RTs and most notably, that RTs would show larger increases in antic-
ipation of negative changes, compared to positive.
Materials and methods
Design
Our study used a within-subject experimental design with three levels (blocks): a baseline and
two experimental blocks. The baseline block was always presented first. Both experimental
blocks were preceded by a message forecast that was either positive or negative. The order of the
positive and negative messages was counterbalanced across participants. The study has fully
complied with APA’s and with Declaration of Helsinki’s statements of ethical principles for psy-
chological research involving human subjects. Participants provided both a written and active
consent for taking part in the study. The Ethics Committee Faculty of Social Sciences (ECSS) at
Radboud University, the institute where the research was conducted, has approved the study.
Participants
To estimate the sample size necessary for the study we run a priori power analysis using
Gpower version 3.1.9.2. [53]. Assuming statistical power of β = .90, α-level of .05 and a
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
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conservative effect size d = .25 in a 3-block within-subjects design, we recruited a total sample
of 40 university students (male = 17, female = 23), who were tested in the lab. Their age ranged
from 18 to 33 years (M = 23.4; SD = 3.3 years). Each participant was offered a standard partici-
pation credit and additionally the chance of winning one out of five checks of 25.00 euro,
based on their performance in the BART.
Risk taking in the BART
As described, the BART is an economic decision game in which participants can make actual
profit by taking successive risks. In the modified version of the BART we used in our study,
each balloon could be maximally inflated 12 times before a definite burst occurred. At any
moment, players could choose to withdraw and stop inflating the balloon as to save the
acquired amount to that point, and subsequently start inflating a new balloon. This way the
BART visually resembles a balloon economy and simulates realistic decision-making, as each
balloon inflation is a risky decision (with unknown, yet quantifiable, first order risk probabili-
ties over time) that can result either in an increase of possible gains or in a loss of the gains
accumulated up to the point of burst for each balloon. See Fig 1 for a schematic illustration of
the BART.
For creating the experiment we used Presentation version 15.0 software (Neurobiological
Systems inc., USA, San Francisco Bay Area). A gaming keyboard was used for collecting
responses to maximize temporal accuracy of RT recordings; the space bar was used for inflate
responses and the left control button was used for collect (cash-in) responses. Participants
were instructed to use their right hand for inflating the balloon and their left hand for cashing-
in. Prior to the task participants were only told that the balloon could be inflated up to a maxi-
mum of 12 times and that a certain explosion would occur at that point. Participants were fur-
ther instructed to inflate at will until an explosion occurred or before deciding to cash-in;
subsequently they would start inflating a new balloon. At the beginning of each trial, partici-
pants viewed a picture of an oval blue balloon (initial dimensions: 3 cm high x 2 cm twelve:
36 cm high x 24 cm wide) at the midpoint of a 21” computer screen (white background) with
the monetary value set to 0.00 in its center (font type: Arial; font size: 12 pt.), a box displaying
the gains earned at the bottom right of the screen, and a blue indeterminate process bar was
Fig 1. Time-course of events at a given trial of the BART task. Note: Every inflation response was
followed by an interval of 1000ms during which the participant heard a pumping sound and saw a process bar
loading. The response resulted in either an increase in the balloon size or to a balloon burst. Following a cash-
in response or a balloon burst, positive and negative feedback screens (visual and auditory feedback) were
presented respectively, for 1200ms.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.g001
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displayed below the balloon picture. Each inflation response was followed by a fixed interval of
1000ms, during which an inflation sound (300ms) was played and the process bar loaded for
1000ms. After this interval the balloon either increased in size (discretely) by 8%, or exploded.
In case of a successful inflation, the wager value at the center of the updated balloon picture
increased (see Table 1 for a detailed description of the successive wagers at each inflation step).
In case of an explosion a negative feedback screen was presented on the screen for 1200ms,
during which a picture of an explosion, an explosion sound (900ms) and the text “Balloon
popped. . . No gains acquired” were displayed. A cash-in response resulted in presentation of a
positive feedback screen for 1200ms, during which a clinking sound (200ms) was played and
the text “Balloon saved! Your gains are added” was displayed. After presentation of either the
positive or the negative feedback screen, participants could start inflating a new balloon.
Procedure
Participants were familiarized with the BART by first playing 5 practice trials (balloons). Sub-
sequently, participants were presented with a baseline block of 60 trials and with two more
blocks of 60 trials each. At the end of each block of 60 trials, a text message (font type: Arial;
font size: 28; font color: navy blue) on a black background appeared on the screen, informing
participants they could rest for maximum three minutes (self-paced) before they began with
the next set of balloons. Before each of these two experimental blocks participants were pre-
sented with either a positive or a negative message–counterbalanced–on a black background
(font type: Arial; font size: 36; font color: ochre). These messages only introduced a possibility
that an economic change might occur at some point, were neutrally framed and only differed
in valence. Specifically, the messages read as follows: “Positive (negative) economic changes
may occur within the coming trials. In this case, the chances of explosions will decrease
(increase), which will result in balloons popping at bigger (smaller) sizes, and can influence
your total gains”.
Following all 180 trials of the BART, participants completed six open questions and 18 scale
items on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 4 = average, 7 = completely) measuring dif-
ferent aspects of their experience of the game, including items about trust derived from the
Table 1. Probabilistic and pay-off structure in the BART Task.
Number of inflation
1–12
Gamble associated with each
inflation
Probability (p) of burst for each inflation
step
1 0.05 0.0
2 0.15 0.15
3 0.25 0.23
4 0.40 0.30
5 0.60 0.38
6 0.85 0.46
7 1.15 0.53
8 1.50 0.61
9 1.90 0.69
10 2.35 0.76
11 2.85 0.84
12 3.20 1
Note. In our study, we used a maximum point of 12 inflations per balloon (trial), with a 0.0% probability of a
burst for the first inflation increasing up to 100% in inflation number 12.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.t001
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messages (“Did the messages you received influence your expectations on the trials that fol-
lowed?”), change of strategy (“Did you change your decision strategy after the positive/nega-
tive message was presented?”), change in attention (“I was paying more attention in the game,
after the positive/negative message was presented”), actual change noticed (“Did you notice
changes in the balloons’ points of burst following presentation of the positive/negative mes-
sage?”), and affect resulting from each of the two messages (“I felt more relaxed/anxious while
playing the game, in the trials that followed the positive/negative message”); results involving
these variables are reported below. The questionnaire further included 15 closed questions
(socioeconomic status, age, gender, education level) and 20 scale items adopted from the DOS-
PERT scale [54], in order to check for individual differences in impulse-related behaviors (e.g.
gambling, use of medicine, recreational substances, tobacco and alcohol); none of these vari-
ables were found to relate with task performance. The experiment lasted 45–55 minutes, based
on participants’ pace.
Data analysis
To test our first hypothesis we calculated risk taking as the average number of inflations per
balloon for those trials in which the balloon did not burst separately for each block. Following
convention, we also calculated and report number of balloon bursts per block per participant.
We then compared differences in these scores between the three blocks using repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
To address our second and third hypotheses, we recorded RT data on inflation responses
and we calculated averaged RTs as a function of inflation steps across all trials. We then
tested for differences in RTs as a function of inflation steps by means of a repeated measures
ANOVA, and we used regression analysis techniques and a simple t-test to compare the differ-
ence in the steepness of the RTs function slopes between the two main experimental blocks.
All data were preprocessed and analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh (version
20.0, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). All data were analyzed anonymously.
Results
Behavioral performance in the BART
The analysis of risk taking was limited to balloons for which the subjects chose to stop so that
no explosion occurred. In all three blocks, the number of “balloons collected” (instances in
which participants opted for collecting gains and thus to stop inflating the balloon) was greater
than the number of “balloons bursts” (instances in which the balloon exploded)–see Table 2
for descriptive statistics.
Analysis of balloon inflations, balloon bursts and actual earnings. Some subjects
inflated the balloons as many as eleven times. Inspection of the raw data revealed that only
four single trials from one corresponding subject scored three or more standard deviation
points above the mean. In the analysis we removed these data points. The findings reported
have not been influenced by this choice.
All data were normally distributed, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-Wilk test (p> .05).
We first ran a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA to test for order effects (Order as a between
subject variable). The analysis showed that neither the effect of Order, F(1 38) = .279 p = .601;
partial η2 = .007, nor the interaction between Order and Block (F(2 76) = .848, p = .433, partial
η2 = .022) were significant. Thus, we proceeded by assuming one homogenous group of 40
participants, and tested our first (H1) main hypothesis using one-way repeated measures
ANOVA tests with three levels (Block: baseline, negative, positive). The assumption of spheric-
ity was met, as assessed by Mauchly’s test of sphericity (χ2(2) = .970 p = .565).
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
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The analysis showed a main effect of Block F(2,78) = 26.446, p< .001, partial η2 = .404.
In support of our first (H1) hypothesis, planned contrasts showed that compared to balloon
inflations at baseline (M = 5.86, SD = 1.03) participants inflated the balloon significantly less
strongly (less risk taking) following the negative message (M = 5.29, SD = 1.09), an effect of
F(1,39) = 18.733, p< .001, partial η2 = .324; and they inflated more (more risk taking) after the
positive message (M = 6.24, SD = 1.13), an effect of F(1,39) = 7.405, p = .010, partial η2 = .160.
The difference in inflation scores between the negative and the positive message was signifi-
cant, F(1,39) = 34.001, p< .001, partial η2 = .466. See Fig 2 for a schematic illustration of these
results.
Fig 2. Risk taking in the BART task as a function of number of inflations in each experimental block.
Note: The dashed line represents performance in the baseline; error bars show 95% confidence intervals;
asterisks indicate significance values (*p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.g002
Table 2. Behavioral Performance in the BART Task: Descriptive Statistics.
Block Variables N Min Max M (SD) SE 95% CI
Baseline (no message) Nr of adj. inflations 40 3.69 8.25 5.85 (1.03) .163 [5.52, 6.19]
Balloon bursts 40 12 36 25.20 (5.52) .873 [23.43, 26.96]
Balloons collected 40 24 48 34.80 (5.52) .873 [33.03, 36.56]
Actual earnings 40 19.65 44.55 32.30 (5.95) .885 [30.51, 34.08]
Negative message Nr of adj. inflations 40 2.85 8.04 5.29 (1.09) .173 [4.95, 5.65]
Balloon bursts 40 11 36 22.00 (6.87) 1.087 [19.80, 24.19]
Balloons collected 40 24 49 38.00 (6.87) 1.087 [35.80, 40.19]
Actual earnings 40 15.75 41.25 29.84 (5.85) .926 [27.97, 31.71]
Positive message Nr of adj. inflations 40 4.27 8.95 6.24 (1.13) .179 [5.88, 6.60]
Balloon bursts 40 15 40 27.85 (6.70) 1.059 [25.70, 29.99]
Balloons collected 40 20 45 32.15 (6.70) 1.059 [30.01, 34.29]
Actual earnings 40 22.85 45.25 32.09 (5.12) .810 [30.45, 33.73]
Note. Number of adjusted inflations refers to the average number of inflations in trials for which the balloon did not burst.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.t002
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To (post-hoc) explore the idea that the negative (compared to the positive) anticipation
could result in a stronger prediction bias, we computed difference scores for inflation responses
between the negative forecast block and the baseline (ΔM = .57, r = .569, SE = .130, 95% CI
[0.24, 0.89]) and between the positive forecast block and the baseline (ΔM = .38, r = .399, SE =
.141, 95% CI [0.31, 0.73]). Subsequently, we performed a post hoc paired t-test to compare these
differences and found that the negative message showed a larger difference from the baseline,
compared to the positive message (t(1,39) = 7.811 p< .001 d = .211), in support of the idea of a
stronger prediction bias following negative messages than positive messages.
Following convention, we ran similar analyses for testing differences in balloon bursts.
There were no outliers and data were normally distributed in all three blocks, as assessed with
boxplots and the Shapiro-Wilk test (all p values were> .05), respectively. The assumption of
sphericity was met (Mauchly’s test: χ2(2) = 4.807, p = .090). As expected, differences in balloon
bursts were found statistically significant (main effect of Block) across the three blocks of trials
F(2, 78) = 22.381, p< .001, partial η2 = .365. Planned contrasts showed that compared to bal-
loon bursts in the baseline (M = 25.20, SD = 5.52) participants burst less balloons following
the negative message block (M = 22.00, SD = 6.87), an effect of F(1, 39) = 9.932, p = .003, partial
η2 = .203, while they burst more balloons following the positive message block (M = 27.85,
SD = 6.70), an effect of F(1, 39) = 10.965, p = .002, partial η2 = .219. Similar to the analysis of
the number of inflations, we (post-hoc) explored differences in change scores for balloon
bursts between the negative forecast block and the baseline and between the positive forecast
block and the baseline. Following the negative message, the change in balloon bursts from the
baseline was larger compared to the positive message, and a post-hoc paired samples t-test
showed that this difference was significant (t(1,39) = 7.733 p< .001 d = .113).
Significant differences were also found in actual earnings made in the BART across the
three blocks: one-way repeated measures ANOVA with three levels (baseline, negative message
condition, positive message condition) revealed a main effect of Block, F(2, 78) = 3.805, p =
.026, partial η2 = .089. On average, earnings made in the negative message condition (M =
29.84 €, SD = 5.85, SE = .926, 95% CI [27.97 31.71]) were significantly lower compared to earn-
ings made in the baseline (M = 32.30 €, SD = 5.95, SE = .885, 95% CI [30.51 34.08], p< .01), as
well as earnings made in the positive message condition (M = 32.09 €, SD = 5.12, SE = .810,
95% CI [30.45 33.73], p< .05); there was no significant difference between the positive and the
baseline conditions (p = .843).
Stability of the effect over time. To test how persistent the influence of economic fore-
casts may be, we further tested whether the observed effect of the messages on risk taking was
stable across the sequence of all trials of each block. the messages induced a persistent change
in the perception of costs and benefits associated with decisions in the task, one would expect
the effect to be consistent throughout each of the two experimental blocks. This would provide
an indication for a more general shift in participants’ mental model of the BART economy,
rather than a transient effect of arousal or emotional priming.
To statistically test this prediction, we compared the effect of the messages on the number
of inflations in the first half (30 trials) versus the second half (30 trials) of all trials in each
block. We used a 3 x 2 within subjects ANOVA, with three levels for the factor Block and two
levels for the factor Time (Time1: first half of 30 versus Time 2: second half of 30 trials). Nei-
ther the effect of Time F(1, 76) = .172 p = .680 partial η2 = .002 nor the Block x Time interac-
tion F(1.64, 125.08) = .510 p = .602 partial η2 = .007) was significant. To visually illustrate
performance over time, we also regressed mean number of inflations on trial number in each
block (see Fig 3). We found no significant change in risk taking over the course of 60 trials
for none of the two experimental conditions (R2negative = .075, βnegative = .073; R2positive = −.054
βpositive = -.006).
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
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Reaction times (RTs) in the BART
To test our second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses, we computed average RTs associated with
the decision to inflate across all participants and for each of the two experimental blocks.
Because the first inflation step was associated with a zero probability for the balloons to
explode and because reaction times were always slower compared to the subsequent steps
reflecting the change of screen to the new trial, it was removed from the analysis. Visual
inspection of RT data using histograms and boxplots indicated that responses above 3000 mil-
liseconds represented outliers. We calculated z scores of RT data for each participant per block
and inflation step, and removed data points that scored three or more standard deviation
points above the mean for the corresponding observations. The removal of these data resulted
in reducing the total number of cases by 2.8%, without affecting the results reported below.
For an overview of the descriptive statistics for RT data, see Table 3.
Increase of RTs as a function of riskiness of the decision. Each successive inflation
response in the BART is a decision associated with a higher level of perceived risk. Hence we
predicted RTs to increase as a function of inflation step. Furthermore, we expected this upward
slope in RTs to increase more steeply following the negative (compared to positive) economic,
as an implicit measure of participants’ biased perception of the BART reward variance. We
computed average RTs per inflation step for each participant and we used a criterion of at least
ten cases per data point. We obtained data for all participants (N = 40) up to inflation step
number six, as many participants did not take as much risk as more than six inflations. There-
fore, we then ran a 5 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Step (inflation step 2–6) and message
Block (positive vs. negative) both as within subject factors, to test for RT differences between
the two experimental message blocks. As Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9) = 33.842 p<.001, Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected tests are reported (ε = .68). We did not find a significant main effect of Block (p = .675),
however we found a strong effect of Step F (1.829, 71.348) = 36.221, p< .001, partial η2 = .482
and a strong interaction (Step x Block) effect F (2.738, 106.789) = 7.737, p< .001, partial η2 =
.166, indicating that the RTs change as a function of the increase in inflation step was different
between the two experimental blocks.
Inspection of averaged RTs per condition across inflation steps (see Fig 4) suggested that
the slope of RTs across step was steeper in the negative than in the positive forecast message
Fig 3. Risk taking as a function of trial number 1–60, for each block of trials. Note: middle dashed line
and circles indicate performance in the baseline; bottom bold black line and down-pointing arrows denote
performance in the negative message block; top solid grey line and up-pointing arrows denote performance in
the positive message block. No significant changes in risk taking across 60 trials were found in the two
experimental blocks.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.g003
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block. An additional analysis was therefore conducted to investigate the difference in steepness
of the RT slopes in the two main experimental blocks; to include more data points in the analy-
sis we included inflation steps beyond number six. Using linear regression, we first regressed
average RT scores on inflation step number, separately for each participant and for each of the
Fig 4. Averaged regression lines of reaction times (RTs) for inflation responses, as a function of
increase in inflation step number, for each of the three blocks of trials. Note: the top light grey dashed
line represents averaged regression slope in the baseline. The two bottom dark solid and grey dashed lines
show averaged regression slope in the negative and in the positive message blocks, respectively. The first
inflation step was excluded from all analyses (see text).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.g004
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Reaction Times (RT) in the BART Task.
Number of Inflation Step Block n (SD) Mean RT (SD) SE
Step 2 Baseline (no message) 59 (1.14) 308.71 (358.12) 7.44
Negative Message 59 (1.60) 225.22 (260.81) 5.52
Positive Message 59 (.80) 255.62 (343.87) 7.29
Step 3 Baseline 55 (2.95) 319.33 (358.70) 7.71
Negative Message 53 (4.58) 228.03 (297.41) 6.59
Positive Message 54 (2.46) 249.26 (347.53) 7.65
Step 4 Baseline 48 (4.83) 353.34 (371.98) 8.57
Negative Message 45 (9.86) 245.35 (297.11) 7.14
Positive Message 48 (4.60) 256.39 (349.21) 8.16
Step 5 Baseline 39 (9.68) 432.16 (456.91) 11.60
Negative Message 35 (10.98) 276.90 (338.55) 9.33
Positive Message 41 (7.74) 276.10 (349.98) 8.87
Step 6 Baseline 29 (12.23) 465.42 (442.99) 13.26
Negative Message 23 (12.39) 307.99 (322.81) 11.13
Positive Message 31 (9.28) 294.12 (337.01) 9.99
Step 7 Baseline 17 (10.14) 551.58 (516.02) 20.60
Negative Message 13 (10.10) 339.96 (342.70) 16.26
Positive Message 20 (10.91) 313.87 (326.19) 11.97
Step 8 Baseline 7 (6.58) 598.92 (473.57) 31.09
Negative Message 6 (5.83) 446.99 (432.17) 35.40
Positive Message 10 (8.07) 380.04 (392.52) 21.04
Note: n refers to the mean number of trials preserved for the analysis of RTs, per subject; in parenthesis, the standard deviation. Note. The first step
(inflation step number 1) was excluded from all analyses (see text).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353.t003
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two main experimental blocks. The regression analysis accounted for approximately 85% of
the variance in RTs for the negative (R2negative = .693) and the positive (R2positive = .669) mes-
sage blocks, reflecting the reliability of this approach. We then extracted the β values and inter-
cept values for each of the two experimental blocks, and eventually compared how differently
RTs changed as a function of the increase in inflation step between the two experimental
blocks. A paired-samples t-test was finally used to statistically test the difference in β values, i.e.
the mean steepness of the two averaged regression slopes. The assumption of normality was
not violated, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p = .145). We found that the negative eco-
nomic message elicited a stronger increase in the rate of change of RTs per inflation step com-
pared to the positive message, t(39) = 2.514 p = .016 d = .397.
Subjective experience in the BART
Besides the behavioral measures reported so far we also obtained self-reports that may provide
some further information on the way that participants’ experienced the game and their trust
in the messages that were presented. Participants’ answers on the seven-point Likert scale
(1 = not at all, 4 = average, 7 = completely) indicated that they experienced some anxiety in
response to the negative message (M = 3.58, SD = 1.43, one-sample t-test χ2(39) = 15.809, p<
.001) and were somewhat relieved in response to the positive message (M = 3.78, SD = 1.42,
one-sample t-test χ2 (39) = 16.778, p< .001). They reported that both messages (positive and
negative together) had influenced their expectations in the trials that followed (M = 5.10,
SD = 1.72).
To explore possible differences between the (positive and negative) message conditions we
ran paired t-tests on the corresponding self-reports. Participants reported that they changed
their strategy after the positive (M = 4.93, SD = 1.65) and after the negative (M = 4.63, SD =
1.90) messages were presented, yet this difference was insignificant (p = .142). Participants
reported to have been more attentive following presentation of the negative (M = 3.93, SD =
1.97) message than following presentation of the positive message (M = 3.33, SD = 1.40),
t(39) = 2.726, p = .010). However, they did not report being more or less careful in their deci-
sions after receiving the negative (M = 4.03, SD = 1.76) than following the positive (M = 4.35,
SD = 1.68) message (p = .465). Lastly, participants reported that they noticed a stronger change
in the game following the positive (M = 4.88, SD = 1.66) than following the negative (M = 3.45,
SD = 1.89) message, t(39) = 2.903, p = .006.
Discussion
In this study, we used the BART to test the hypothesis that economic forecasts can bias peo-
ple’s beliefs of the economy and influence their economic decision-making. Such a mechanism
would contribute to the discussion about self-fulfilling prophecy effects in economic decision-
making whereby the belief that economic change may come about will cause people to act as if
as this reality has already set in, causing the anticipated change to become an actual reality. In
support of this hypothesis, our study showed that speculative messages forecasting a possible
change in economic conditions influenced recipients’ beliefs about the riskiness of their
choices (as reflected in RTs) and affected the riskiness of their economic decision-making
(number of balloon inflations) over a series of 60 trials in the BART. These findings are in
accord with the idea that economic forecasts may unwillingly influence economic decisions
such that the forecasted economic change becomes a reality.
In line with the proposal that economic forecasts in media news may generate a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy effect [6,8,11–17,19,25–29,31,33–35] positive and negative economic messages
caused participants to take more and less risk in the BART, respectively (Fig 2). Participants
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acted in accordance with the forecasted reality of the BART economy, adapting their risk tak-
ing as if the predicted change had already occurred, whereas in fact no change had occurred at
all. We suggest that in conditions of strong ambiguity (e.g. it is unclear whether the economy
is going up or down) and when data may be consistent with either perspective (i.e. examples of
positive and negative economic development can found in both rising and declining econo-
mies) people have little opportunity to detect and correct false forecasts and beliefs through
sampling. Although no changes occurred in balloons’ probabilities of bursts, following either
the positive or negative message, participants did not pick up on this lack of change. Further-
more, we found that the effect of positive and negative messages on risk taking was stable
over time (Fig 3). This suggests that the adopted economic belief generated a continuous influ-
ence on risk taking throughout the block of 60 trials. Not surprisingly, participants made less
money in the negative message condition than in the positive message condition. Hence a false
prediction about a negative or a positive change in the BART economy was accompanied by
an actual decrease or increase in participants’ earnings, exhibiting the self-fulfilling prophecy
effect.
In accordance with our second hypothesis, we found that reaction times for inflation
responses increased as the risk associated with each successive inflation step increased, in all
three blocks. This general increase in reaction time reflects more time for processing potential
risks and benefits associated with successive decisions in the BART: the more risky the deci-
sion became, in terms of stake value and chance of winning or losing, the longer it took par-
ticipants to make a decision [50,51]. Reaction times in the baseline block were substantially
higher compared to the two experimental blocks. This may reflect a high initial uncertainty
about the implicit pay-off model underlying the BART and/or extra time associated with learn-
ing a new task, considering that the baseline was always presented first. Most notably and in
line with our third hypothesis, the rate of increase in RTs was greater for the negative than for
the positive message condition (Fig 4). This finding in RTs supports our idea that the effect of
economic forecasting on risk taking (i.e. the number of inflations) reflects a change in per-
ceived riskiness of successive inflation steps in the BART task. That is, participants appeared to
have adjusted their mental model of the BART economy following the forecast of economic
change.
Predictive coding of forecasted economic change
Recent advances in computational modeling and cognitive neuroscience have presented a uni-
fying framework for brain functioning and human cognition [55–60] that may apply particu-
larly well in explaining how beliefs about the economy may direct economic decision-making.
According to the predictive coding framework, brains are essentially hierarchical prediction
machines that try to match higher-level hypotheses (e.g. beliefs about the state of the world)
with lower-level (perceptual and conceptual) input [55]. People’s view about the state of the
economy may be considered a typically high level belief that is shaped by accumulating evi-
dence at lower levels (e.g. information about different economic indicators as well as more
individual experiences). Priors high up in the hierarchy are general beliefs that are usually
quite stable over time and that do not generate very precise predictions at lower levels. Conse-
quently, it will take a considerable amount of time and evidence for people’s beliefs about the
economy to change gradually through sampling. However, general economic forecasts may
more directly and immediately influence public opinions about the economy [61], for instance
by presenting conclusions that directly address prior beliefs (as for instance in the headline
‘Here’s one more sign the US economy is slowing’ [62]). As indicated earlier, such conclusions
are difficult to falsify considering the ambiguous nature of economic indices. Hence, when a
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false belief is adopted, it may be difficult to change through repeated sampling over time. Con-
sequently, incorrect biases in people’s belief about the economy may continue to influence eco-
nomic decision-making, until another convincing economic perspective is presented that
biases belief in a different direction. In line with this idea, visualization and regression of risk
taking (nr. of inflations) as a function of trial number (Fig 4) indicated that effects of positive
and negative economic forecasts set in quickly and remained stable over the course of the
block. Furthermore findings in RTs, and specifically the increase and decrease in RT slopes
with step size following negative and positive economic messages, corroborate the idea that
the economic messages effectuated a change in participants’ psychological reality, i.e. the per-
ception of more or less risk of popping the balloon. These findings are consistent with a pre-
dictive coding account wherein changes in belief bias people’s perception and behavior.
Affect as an alternative explanation
The current study investigated to what extend forecasted economic change may influence cog-
nitive economic decision-making of individuals. A number of previous studies using either the
BART [45–49] or other behavioral measures [63–66] have shown that manipulation of emo-
tional affect may also bias economic risk taking. Affective reactions can be particularly salient
in circumventing uncertainty and expediting the decision-making process [67]. Consequently,
emotional affect may present an alternative explanation for our study’s findings. Although
affective states undoubtedly played a role in the current experiment, as for instance reflected in
self-reported levels of relief and anxiety following messages of positive and negative economic
forecast, there are several arguments that go against the idea of affective states as the major
explanation of the findings. First, although participants indicated that they had experienced
some relief and anxiety in response to positive and negative massages, ratings showed that
these self-reported affective responses were moderate at most and below the average of the
scale (<4). Instead, participants were more affirmative with respect to the question if messages
had influenced their expectations in the trials that followed (>5) which is in line with the fact
that message text were constructed to bias participants expectations, and not to trigger affect.
Second, and more convincingly, we found that positive and negative messages exerted a con-
tinuous effect on economic risk taking throughout the block, across a series of 60 trials. This
pattern of results is incompatible with an affective explanation, as one would expect the effect
to dissipate as the initial emotional response disappears and the participant adjusts to the new
conditions [45,46]. We note here that a predictive coding account would also predict a gradual
correction of incorrect beliefs over time. Considering the noisy and unpredictable nature of
the BART, however, such a correction would likely require many more trials than the limited
number of 60 trials per block that was included in the present experiment. In all, we argue
that our manipulation of economic forecast influenced participants’ decision-making mainly
through cognitive means, that is, by changing participants’ beliefs about the BART economy.
Limitations
Obviously, making decisions in the lab where only small amounts of money can be gained dif-
fers from making economic decisions in real-life, were the stakes are much larger. In addition
to this, participants in this study could either win or not win, but never loose money. Conse-
quently, in the current study we only addressed behavioral performance in the gains domain,
and not in the losses domain. However, we think that the overall pattern of the results observed
here would be similar for larger stakes and possibly even amplified in the losses domain, simi-
lar to what has been found in earlier studies that investigated framing effects in gains and losses
using the BART task [42–44].
Self-fulfilling prophecies in economic decision-making
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174353 March 23, 2017 13 / 18
The current study used a rather homogenous population, namely students, and differences
in both behavioral and neural responsiveness between younger and older adults are well docu-
mented in existing decision-making literature [68–71]. However, we do think that the findings
in our experiment capture the psychological reality of forecasted economic changes on deci-
sion-making that applies to both young and old. It would be interesting to investigate if the
self-fulfilling prophecy effect manifests differently in younger and in older populations. How-
ever, we would be surprised if the general effect of economic forecasts on decision-making
would not be present in older adults.
Last, in our study post-hoc calculation of effect sizes suggested that the observed effect of
the messages on the number of inflations as a direct measure of risk taking was larger for the
case of the negative (η2 = .324) as compared to the positive forecasts (η2 = .159). However, the
baseline was always presented first and may not represent a neutral contrast. Therefore this
effect deserves replication, using sufficient sample and a fully counterbalanced design. We
note however that this pattern accords well with findings in other areas of research that have
shown negative economic news to produce stronger responses in various indicators of eco-
nomic activity, compared to positive [6,9,10,13,14,16,19,29,31,33–35].
Broader implications
In addition to studies in economic psychology that have identified the important role of emo-
tions in economic decision-making [45–49,63–67] the present study suggest that forecasted
economic change may bias people’s psychological models about the economy and can induce
a self-fulfilling prophecy effect. The idea that false beliefs can exert a strong influence on
behavior could also extend to decision-making domains beyond the economy. Comparable
effects may be found in the domain of politics, specifically in the case of elections. In predicting
the results of an election, journalists may indirectly and unwillingly influence the outcome
of these elections. Consistent with this idea Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994) found that tel-
evision newscast of election polls significantly biased voters preference towards the leading
candidate who was forecasted to win, causing in a self-fulfilled prophecy [72]. Similar to the
forecasts about economy, predictions of election outcomes are difficult to falsify and may con-
sequently exert a strong bias on people’s beliefs and their subsequent behavior. It is important
to note however that self-fulfilled prophecy effects are by no means limited to economic and
political forecasting. Such effects may be witnessed in any system that is sufficiently complex,
variable and noisy to the extent that claims or conclusions are difficult to falsify, such as e.g. in
cases of religion and health care [73–75].
Conclusion
Our study points out the importance of cognitive beliefs in economic decision-making in addi-
tion to emotional mechanisms that are known to drive people towards taking or avoiding
financial risks. Forecasted economic change may cause immediate adaptations in people’s
mental models of the economy which may be difficult to correct and that may influence the
perception and sampling of economic information over a prolonged period of time. Further-
more, and importantly, incorrect beliefs about upcoming changes in the economy may bias
economic decision-making such that forecasted economic change becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
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